Note: This article will be published in the August
2002 edition of the Journal of Internet Law (http://www.gcwf.com/journal/)
U.S. Encryption Export
Control Policy Update: 2002
By Roszel C. Thomsen II and
Antoinette D. Paytas
Table of Contents
IV.
Wassenaar Cryptography Note
V.
Technical Review Requirement
B.
New Eligibility for Technical Review
C.
New Exemption from Technical Review
VI.
Export Licensing Requirement
VII. Post-Export Reporting Requirement
A.
No Reporting for Mass Market Software
B.
No Reporting for Community Source Software
A.
Products Qualifying as “Retail”.
1.
Certain Networking Products
2.
Certain Network Management Products
3.
Short Range Wireless Products
B.
Products Qualifying as “Mass Market”
C.
Products with “Dormant” Crypto.
The
United States maintains export controls on military cryptographic products and
technology under the Arms Export Control Act[1]
(AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations[2]
(ITAR) and on dual-use cryptographic products and technologies under the Export
Administration Act[3] (EAA) and
the Export Administration Regulations[4]
(EAR). These export controls are
coordinated with members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United States recently updated its
export control regulations governing cryptographic products and technologies[5],
in order to reflect changes made to the Wassenaar Arrangement List
of Dual Use Goods and Technologies And Munitions List and to clarify
other provisions of its policy with respect to cryptographic export controls.
In
general, persons who export cryptographic products and technologies must submit
them for a one-time technical review by the Bureau
of Industry and Security (formerly the Bureau of Export Administration
(BXA)) and the National Security Agency (NSA)
prior to export. Some exports of
cryptographic products and technologies require licenses issued by the Bureau
of Industry and Security (BIS). In many
cases, post-export reporting BIS and NSA also is required.
Although
the recent policy update is welcomed by Industry, the cryptographic export
control policy remains complex and still favors some products (particularly
open source products) over others (including proprietary source products). Further reform is not a high priority of the
U.S. Government, at present. Concerted
effort by Industry will be required to achieve further reforms.
When
George H.W. Bush assumed the Presidency in 1988, the laws and regulations
governing the export of cryptographic products and technologies were quite
simple. All cryptographic products and
technologies were regarded as
“munitions”, subject to the jurisdiction of the State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls under
authority of the AECA and the ITAR. The
policies and procedures governing the issuance of export licenses were simple,
too. All exports required licenses, and
all applications for licenses were denied (unless the customer was either a subsidiary
of an American company, or a financial institution).
At
the time, diplomats and the military were the primary users of cryptographic
products. However, the population of
users was beginning to increase and diversify.
A number of factors precipitated these trends. The invention of public key cryptography by Diffie and Hellman
made it easier to exchange cryptographic keys.
The increasing power of personal computers made it feasible for ordinary
folk to utilize sophisticated cryptographic algorithms. Software publishers began to implement
cryptographic features into their products.
As a result, Industry and public interest groups began lobbying the
government to relax the onerous export controls on cryptography.
A
trend toward the progressive relaxation of export controls on cryptography has
proceeded for the last decade and a half.
First, products that used cryptography for limited purposes, like access
control and authentication, were transferred from the “munitions” control
regime to the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Export
Administration (as it was known at that time), which administers export
controls on “dual use” products under authority of the EAA and EAR[6]. Second, products using “weak” encryption for
privacy of communications and stored data were transferred from the “munitions”
to the “dual use” control regime[7].
Nevertheless,
neither the government, nor Industry, nor the public interest groups were
entirely satisfied with the state of encryption export controls at the end of
the Presidency of George H.W. Bush. The
government continued to insist that widespread use of cryptography threatened
its ability to conduct electronic surveillance. Despite tacit assurances from the government that the permitted
standard for export of “weak” cryptography would increase over time, Industry
felt that “weak” cryptography was not likely to be competitive with stronger
cryptographic products available from sources outside the United States. Public interest groups were concerned that
“big brother” was using the export control laws and regulations to prevent the
public at large from protecting themselves against threats to the security of
their personal information.
In
the early years of the Clinton Administration, the public debate over the
export controls on cryptography became increasingly rancorous. The Clinton Administration attempted to
reconcile the government’s interest in surveillance with the public’s interest
in strong cryptography through a policy known over time as “key escrow” or “key
recovery” or “key management”[8]. The basic premise was that the strong
cryptographic products should be eligible for export, but only if they
incorporated a feature allowing access to the keys required for the government
to obtain access to plaintext. The
Clinton Administration’s key escrow/recovery/management policy was an abject
failure. The market resoundingly
rejected products incorporating such key escrow/recovery/management features,
and foreign competitors began to displace American companies in the
marketplace.
Finally,
in January of 2000, the Clinton Administration essentially abandoned its export
control policy based on key escrow/recovery/management. It replaced the regime favoring key escrow
with a policy supported by three pillars.
First, the government would have the opportunity to conduct a technical
review of most cryptographic products prior to export. Second, the government would retain the
right to license certain types of particularly sensitive exports. Third, the government would receive reports
of exports, after the fact[9].
Since
January of 2000, the government has modified the export controls on
cryptography, twice. In October of
2000, the Clinton Administration created a license-free zone for exports of cryptographic
products between and among the fifteen members of the European Union and eight
other countries[10]. In June of 2002, the George W. Bush
Administration amended the export controls on cryptography to conform to the
changed adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement in December of 2000[11].
Although
the export controls on cryptographic products are undoubtedly much more liberal
than they have been in the past, they also have become far more complex. This unfortunate complexity, combined with a
lack of transparency and still substantial pre-export review and post-export
reporting requirements, remain a significant burden on Industry, retarding
exports of strong cryptographic products that are essential to protecting the
privacy of businesses and consumers. The
purpose of this paper is to describe the most recent changes to the export
controls on cryptographic products, as well as to suggest further reforms that
would reduce the regulatory burden without compromising legitimate national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.
The
primary purpose of the recent encryption export control policy update is to
implement the changes to the Wassenaar List of Dual-use Products and
Technologies. In December of 2000, the
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement eliminated the 64 bit limitation on
products meeting the requirements of the Cryptography Note. As a result of this change, none of the
other members of the Wassenaar Arrangement
imposed export controls on “mass market” cryptographic products,
regardless of algorithm, key length, or key management features they might
implement, after the spring of 2001. In order to avoid unilaterally
disadvantaging American companies vis-à-vis their foreign competitors, the
Administration of George W. Bush had to publish an implementing regulation in
the Federal Register.
A
secondary purpose of the recent encryption export control reforms is to update
and clarify other provisions of the regulations governing encryption export
controls. These changes certainly are
welcomed, but they fall short of real simplification. Furthermore, the regulations still express a preference for
certain types of software, notably so-called “open source” software, at the
expense of proprietary software.
There
are several reasons why the George W. Bush Administration’s first attempts to
reform the encryption export controls took so long, and are so modest,
especially when compared with prior changes.
The export controls on cryptography have been reformed to such an extent
that, quite frankly, they are no longer the politically charged issue of
yore. As a result, the National
Security Council under George W. Bush Administration did not take the
leadership role that it had during the Clinton Administration. Political appointees at the Bureau of Export
Administration focused on other priorities, including attempts to re-new the
Export Administration Act, which has lapsed.
Finally, the new regulations were nearing publication when the tragedy
of September 11, 2001, occurred. There
were suggestions that the terrorists had used cryptography to hide evidence of
their crimes, and Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) even suggested that the government
should revert to its (failed) key escrow policy[12]. Under the circumstances, a decent interval
had to elapse, before it would be politically acceptable to relax the export
controls on cryptography.
For
over a decade, Wassenaar member countries (and their predecessors at COCOM) had
recognized the fact that products available through mass market channels simply
were not susceptible of effective export controls. However, until December of 2000, the Wassenaar Cryptography Note
placed a limitation of 64 bits on products with symmetric algorithms that
qualified for decontrol under the note.
Conforming
U.S. regulations to the Wassenaar changes, mass market products today are
classified under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 5A992 and 5D992,
after a one time review by BIS and NSA, and are eligible for export to most
destinations under No License Required (NLR).
In addition, such products are exempt from the post-export reporting
requirements and are automatically eligible for consideration under the de
minimis provisions of the EAR.
Despite
this important change, the basic structure of the cryptographic export controls
remains essentially intact. There are
some clarifications and updates to the technical review, licensing and
reporting requirements, but they are modest.
BIS
and NSA still conduct a technical review of most cryptographic products, prior
to their initial export from the United States. However, the mechanism for administering this review, and the
scope of products requiring review, have changed.
BIS
no longer conducts technical reviews under the Commodity Classification Request
procedure. The information that
exporters must supply to BIS and NSA has not changed, however. The reason for this change is that
legislation to re-new the Export Administration Act currently pending before
the Congress contains a provision that would allow other agencies, in addition
to BIS and NSA, to review Commodity Classification Requests[13]. Neither the George W. Bush Administration
nor the public perceive benefit in having other agencies, notably the Defense,
Energy, Justice and State Departments, involved in the technical review of
cryptographic products. Therefore, the
technical review of cryptographic products was removed from the Commodity
Classification Request procedure.
In
addition, exporters should be aware of three other initiatives that will change
the way that they file technical review requests. The SNAP electronic filing system will be modified to reflect the
new technical review procedure. The
SNAP system also will become mandatory for all filings. In addition, the SNAP system will be
upgraded to allow electronic submission of supporting documents.
One
might hope that these changes to the technical review mechanism would expedite
the processing of new applications. In
2001, exporters filed approximately 1,900 Commodity Classification Requests, of
which approximately 1,300 were for products classified under ECCN 5A002 and
5D002 (approximately 81% of which received the most favorable “retail”
treatment). An additional 600
applications were filed for products classified under 5A992 and 5D992. The average processing time was 56 days in
2001[14].
BIS
has created a new class of products that are eligible for export after the
required technical review for cryptographic test equipment classified under
ECCN 5B002. Note, however, that this
new eligibility does not extend to cryptanalytic equipment, which
remains subject to licensing requirements to all destinations[15].
BIS
has created a new exemption from the technical review requirement, for products
implementing the WiFi wireless encryption standard (also known as IEEE
802.11b). The purpose of this change is
to create a level playing field for various wireless encryption products. Prior to this change, only products
implementing Bluetooth and HomeRF standards, but not 802.11b, were exempt from
the technical review[16].
The
export licensing requirements for cryptographic products have been modified in
several minor respects.
In
2001, the Commerce Department received approximately 200 applications for
export licenses. It approved all of
these applications, except for 36 that were returned without action (either
because the application was unnecessary or was deficient in some respect) and
one that was denied. One quarter of
these applications authorized exports of technology outside the United
States. One quarter of these
applications were for Encryption Licensing Arrangements. The remaining half of these applications
were for licenses authorizing exports to a specific end-user[17].
BXA
did not receive any applications requesting authorization for a service
provider to offer cryptographic services to government end-users. This requirement has been eliminated, which
should represent a reduction in regulatory burden for suppliers of network
infrastructure equipment and software[18].
Industry
had recommended a number of significant reductions in the post-export reporting
requirements. Unfortunately, many of
these recommendations have not been implemented. However, there are two important new relaxations of reporting
requirements.
One
important secondary benefit of implementing the Wassenaar changes of December
2000, is that exporters no longer have to report transfers of mass market
software, regardless of cryptographic strength.
BIS
has removed the requirement for post-export reporting of “community” source
code (i.e., source code that is available to the public free of charge for
non-commercial use but requires payment of fees for commercial use). Community source now is eligible for export
on the same terms as “open” source[19].
There
are several other clarifications to the export controls on cryptography that
are worthy of note.
BIS
has clarified and expanded the list of products that qualify as “retail”
encryption items. Please note that network infrastructure products are still
not eligible for “retail” treatment[20].
The list of examples of “retail” items now includes the following:
(i)
Retail eligibility criteria.
Retail encryption commodities and software are products and components:
(A) Generally available to the public by
means of any of the following:
(1)
Are sold in tangible form through retail outlets independent of the
manufacturer;
(2)
Are specially designed for individual consumer use; or
(3
) Are sold or will be sold in large volume, without restriction, through mail
order transactions, electronic transactions, or telephone call transactions;
and
(B) Meeting all of the following:
(1)
The cryptographic functionality cannot be easily changed by the user;
(2)
Substantial support is not required for installation and use; and
(3)
The cryptographic functionality has not been modified or customized to customer
specification.
(ii)
Additional types of retail encryption products. The following products will also be
considered to be retail encryption products:
(A)
Encryption commodities and software (including key management products) with
key lengths not exceeding 64 bits for
symmetric algorithms, 1024 bits for asymmetric key exchange algorithms, and 160
bits for elliptic curve algorithms. (You may immediately export or reexport
such encryption commodities and software as retail items upon submitting a
completed review request to BIS and the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator, in
accordance with the requirements described in paragraph (d) of this section);
(B)
Encryption products and network-based applications that provide equivalent
functionality to other mass market or retail encryption commodities and
software (refer to the Cryptography Note (Note 3) to part II of Category 5 of
the CCL for the definition of mass market encryption commodities and software);
(C)
Encryption products that are limited to allowing foreign-developed
cryptographic products to operate with U.S. products (e.g. signing). No review
of the foreign-developed cryptography is required;
(D)
Encryption commodities and software that activate or enable cryptographic
functionality in retail encryption products which would otherwise remain
disabled.
(iii)
Examples of eligible retail encryption products: Subject to the
retail eligibility criteria in paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section, retail
encryption items include, but are not limited to, the following:
(A)
General purpose operating systems that do not qualify as mass market;
(B)
Non-programmable encryption chips, and chips that are constrained by design for
retail products;
(C)
Retail networking products, such as low-end routers, firewalls, and virtual
private networking (VPN) equipment designed for small office or home use;
(D)
Desktop applications (e.g. e-mail, browsers, games, word processing, database,
financial applications or utilities) that do not qualify as mass market;
(E)
Programmable database management systems and associated application servers;
(F)
Low-end servers and application-specific servers (including client-server
applications, e.g. Secure Socket Layer (SSL)-based web applications and
applets, servers, and portals);
(G)
Network and security management products designed for, bundled with, or
pre-loaded on single CPU computers, low-end servers or retail networking
products; and
(H)
Short-range wireless components and software that do not qualify as mass market. Products that would be controlled under ECCN
5A002 or 5D002, only because they incorporate components or software which
provide short-range wireless encryption functions, may be exported or
reexported under the retail provisions of License Exception ENC, without review
or reporting.
The
most important changes are to the treatment of certain networking products, the
use of encryption for network management, and components for wireless
encryption products
Although
network infrastructure products are not eligible for retail treatment, BIS has
issued a clarification with respect to network equipment designed for “small
office or home office use” that may qualify as retail. In the past, the government had used an
informal three part test, designating as retail items that had a line speed not
exceeding 2.1 Mbps, encrypted throughput not exceeding 5 Mbps, or supporting no
more than 100 concurrent encrypted tunnels.
Now, the line speed no longer is regarded as a limiting characteristic;
the encrypted throughput has doubled to 10 Mbps, and the 100 concurrent tunnel
limitation remains unchanged[21].
BIS
has added a new example of retail products, including those that provide
network and security management for single CPU computers, low-end servers and
retail networking products. This would
include, for example, an implementation of the Secure Shell protocol for
network management[22].
Short
range wireless products, such as encryption chips designed for retail wireless
products with ranges typically not exceeding 100 meters, would qualify as
retail. This category would include
chips that implement the popular Bluetooth, HomeRF and Wi-Fi standards[23].
Note
that the definition of “mass market” is essentially identical to the definition
of “retail eligibility criteria” set forth above. However, BIS intends that products qualifying as “mass market”
will be a sub-set of those which qualify as “retail”. Examples of mass market products include the following:
mass
market encryption products include, but are not limited to, general purpose
operating systems and desktop applications (e.g. e-mail, browsers, games, word
processing, database, financial applications or utilities) designed for,
bundled with, or pre-loaded on single CPU computers, laptops, or hand-held
devices;
commodities,
software, and components for client Internet appliances and client wireless LAN
devices; home use networking commodities and software (e.g. personal firewalls,
cable modems for personal computers, and consumer set top boxes);
portable or mobile civil telecommunications
commodities and software (e.g. personal data assistants (PDAs), radios, or
cellular products); and
commodities
and software exported via free or anonymous downloads[24].
Note
that the list of products that may qualify as mass market is a subset of those
which may qualify as retail, because the “equivalent functionality” test for
retail does not have an equivalent under the mass market definition.
For
several years, Commodity Classifications have been issued confirming that
products with “dormant” encryption are classified under ECCNs 5A992 and
5D992. In the new encryption policy
update, BIS has incorporated this informal policy into the regulations. Only the software or authorization code that
“activates” the “dormant” encryption is controlled under 5A002 or 5D002[25].
In
the past, some finance specific products have been given “retail” treatment,
including products implementing highly formatted fields as specified in the
Secure Electronic Transactions protocol, whereas other finance specific
products, like Automated Teller Machines, have been exempt from review. The new policy specifically exempts all
encryption products that are “finance specific”. Note, however, that this definition does not include
products that may have end-uses related to financial operations (e.g., supply
chain management) but that are not limited by design to financial transactions.
There
are a number of areas where further reform of the encryption export controls is
highly desirable, from Industry’s perspective.
Real simplification is one example.
Leveling the playing field between open source (open crypto APIs
permitted) and proprietary source (open crypto APIs restricted) is
another. Clarifying the gray area
between network infrastructure products (excluded from retail) and small
office/home office products (eligible for retail) is a third. However, further reform currently is not at
the forefront of the George W. Bush Administration’s agenda. Industry will have to develop proposals that
have market justification and do not unnecessarily impair the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States, in order to achieve further
reform of the encryption export controls.
[1] 22 U.S. C. 2778.
[2] 22 C.F.R. 120 et. seq.
[3] 50 USC App 2401-2411.
[4] 15 C.F.R. 730 et. seq.
[5] 67 Fed. Reg. page (2002).
[6] 56 Fed. Reg. 24824 (1991).
[7] 57 Fed. Reg. 32148 (1993).
[8] Executive Order 13026 of November 15, 1996; 61 Fed. Reg. 58767 (1996).
[9] 65 Fed. Reg. 2492 (2000).
[10] 65 Fed. Reg. 62600 (2000).
[11] 67 Fed. Reg. page?? (2002).
[13] Senate EAA (S. 149) and House EAA (H.R. 2581).
[14] Norman LaCroix at March 2002 RAPTAC.
[15] 15 C.F.R. 740.17.
[16] Id. at 740.17(b)(3)(iii)(H).
[17] Norman LaCroix at March 2002 RAPTAC.
[18] Id.
[19] 15 C.F.R. 740.13(e)(2).
[20] Id. at 740.17(b)(2)(i).
[21] 67 Fed. Reg. 38858.
[22] 15 C.F.R. 740.17(b)(3)(G).
[23] 67 Fed. Reg. 38856.
[24] 15 C.F.R. 742.15(b)(5).
[25] Id. at 742.15(b)(4).